The central analytical question in Unit 4 is: to what extent do a state’s actions and national interest outcomes bring about political stability and/or change in the Indo-Pacific?
This requires understanding what stability and change mean in international politics, and applying those concepts to your selected state’s behaviour.
Political stability in the Indo-Pacific refers to:
- The maintenance of existing power relationships and alliances
- Adherence to established international rules and norms (e.g. UNCLOS, ASEAN centrality)
- The absence of major conflict
- Predictability in state behaviour
Political change refers to:
- Shifts in the regional power balance (new alliances, arms races, emerging powers)
- Changes to international rules or institutions
- New patterns of alignment or non-alignment
- The displacement of one regional order by another
REMEMBER: Stability and change are not simply good and bad. Some instability leads to positive change (decolonisation, democratisation); some “stability” maintains unjust hierarchies. VCAA expects analytical judgment, not a normative preference for stability.
Sources of instability/change:
South China Sea militarisation — China’s construction of artificial islands with military infrastructure (runways, hangars, radar systems) from 2013–2016 changed the physical geography of the region and challenged UNCLOS-based maritime law. The Permanent Court of Arbitration ruled against China’s claims (2016); China’s rejection of this ruling represents a direct challenge to international legal order.
Taiwan Strait tensions — Increased PLA military exercises around Taiwan (2022, 2024) have raised the risk of miscalculation; Taiwan Strait transits by US and allied vessels create friction points. This represents a shift from the relatively stable cross-strait status quo of the 1980s–2000s.
Security agreements in the Pacific — The 2022 China-Solomon Islands agreement fundamentally altered Pacific security dynamics, triggering the largest competitive engagement by external powers in the Pacific since World War II.
Sources of stability:
Economic interdependence — China’s role as the largest trading partner for most Indo-Pacific states creates mutual economic stakes in avoiding conflict. The concept of “selective engagement” or “complex interdependence” means that even adversarial relationships are moderated by trade dependencies.
Multilateral institution engagement — China’s participation in ASEAN-led forums (EAS, ARF), the G20, and its role in RCEP creates institutional channels for managing disputes. Participation in these institutions, even if contested, represents a form of order-maintenance.
Sources of stability:
- The US alliance network (Japan, South Korea, Philippines, Australia, Thailand) has been the foundational architecture of Indo-Pacific security since 1945; US military presence provides extended deterrence that has prevented major inter-state war in the region
- US leadership of multilateral institutions (IMF, World Bank, WTO) has provided economic rules that underpin regional prosperity
Sources of change/instability:
- AUKUS (2021) — introduced nuclear-powered submarines into the Indo-Pacific without IAEA safeguards equivalent to civilian programmes; China and Russia argued this violated the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Whether or not this is legally correct, it represents a new strategic capability that changes China’s strategic calculations.
- Technology war — US export controls on semiconductors represent a new arena of strategic competition with uncertain escalation dynamics
- Domestic political volatility — US presidential election cycles create uncertainty about continuity of commitments; US allies have invested significantly in hedging strategies (Japan’s own defence expansion, South Korea’s autonomous deterrence discussions) in response
| Domain | Assessment |
|---|---|
| Military/security | HIGH change — arms races, new alliances, new platforms (AUKUS submarines, Chinese aircraft carriers) represent a structural shift in regional military balance |
| Economic | MODERATE change — supply chain diversification and technology decoupling underway, but deep interdependence remains; change is gradual not transformational |
| Diplomatic/institutional | MODERATE change — ASEAN centrality being tested, but multilateral institutions continue to function; new formats (QUAD, AUKUS) operating alongside rather than replacing existing structures |
| Normative/legal | HIGH change — China’s rejection of UNCLOS arbitration, US use of sanctions as foreign policy, both challenge rule-of-law norms in international relations |
A strong exam response:
1. Defines stability and change clearly at the outset
2. Analyses specific actions and their effects on regional order
3. Distinguishes between short-term disruption and long-term structural change
4. Reaches a qualified judgment: “The actions of [state] have contributed to significant change in the security domain while maintaining relative stability in economic arrangements, suggesting a partial and uneven transformation of the regional order.”
KEY TAKEAWAY: No state is purely stabilising or purely destabilising. The most defensible argument acknowledges that the same state can bring stability in some domains (economic rules, institutional engagement) and change in others (military posture, legal norm defiance).
VCAA FOCUS: The phrase “to what extent” demands a nuanced, qualified answer. A response that says “China destabilises the region” without qualification will not access the top mark band. A response that explains how China’s economic role stabilises while its military actions destabilise — and then weighs these against each other — will.
EXAM TIP: Use the language of the study design: “political stability and/or change.” The “and/or” is deliberate — you may argue that stability and change are occurring simultaneously in different domains.
